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Ultrabroadband Quantum-Secured Communication
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77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, USA
(Dated: January 8, 2018)
We propose a two-way secure-communication protocol in which Alice uses an amplified sponta-
neous emission source while Bob employs binary phase-shift keying and an optical amplifier. Against
an eavesdropper who captures all the light lost in fibers linking Alice and Bob, this protocol is capable
of 3.5Gbps quantum-secured direct communication at 50 km range. If Alice augments her terminal
with a spontaneous parametric downconverter and both Alice and Bob add channel monitors, they
can realize 2Gbps quantum key distribution at that range against an eavesdropper who injects her
own light into Bob’s terminal. Compared with prevailing quantum key distribution methods, this
protocol has the potential to significantly increase secure key rates at long distances by employing
many ultrabroadband photons per key bit to mitigate channel loss.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Lc
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows a random bit-
string to be shared between remote parties with secu-
rity vouchsafed by the laws of quantum mechanics [1–4].
Were its secret-key rate equal to the desired communica-
tion rate, QKD would enable full information-theoretic
security by means of one-time pad encryption. Unfor-
tunately, demonstrated secret-key rates fall far short of
what is needed for widespread use of one-time pad en-
cryption. At present, therefore, QKD’s principal appli-
cation is to rekey classical cryptosystems, making over-
all security that of the classical system. In this regard,
quantum-secured direct communication (QSDC) [5, 6]
may be preferable to key distribution, especially if it can
be done at high rates. Quantum illumination (QI) [7–
9] is an entanglement-based two-way protocol that has
the potential to accomplish that goal, but in its present
form has two major drawbacks, which will be described
below. In this Letter we report a new protocol, based on
QI, that eliminates these drawbacks and offers unprece-
dented rate-versus-distance capability. The new protocol
realizes passive eavesdropping immunity—i.e., immunity
to an Eve who merely listens to light leaking out of the
connections between Alice and Bob—without the use of
entanglement. That immunity is shown to arise from
the no-cloning theorem, as is the case for the security
of both discrete-variable and continuous-variable QKD.
Entanglement does come into play, however, in making
the new protocol resistant to active eavesdropping, i.e.,
when Eve injects her own light into Bob. We begin our
development with a description of the QI protocol as it
provides the foundation for what will follow.
In QI, Alice creates entangled signal and idler beams
and transmits the signal to Bob while retaining the idler.
Bob modulates the light he receives from Alice using bi-
nary phase-shift keying (BPSK), amplifies the modulated
light to boost the signal strength and mask his message
with amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) noise, and
returns the resulting light to Alice. Owing to the ini-
tial entanglement, Alice can recover Bob’s message while
a passive eavesdropper cannot. The first drawback of
QI is its vulnerabilty to active eavesdropping, which is a
major concern for QI carried out over optical fibers. Nev-
ertheless, we will postpone discussing how active eaves-
dropping might be defeated until we address QI’s other
drawback, which limits its rate-versus-distance capability
even when Eve only employs passive eavesdropping.
Suppose that the protocol from [7] is used on a fiber
channel, as shown in Fig. 1. Here: (1) Alice employs
a continuous-wave (cw) spontaneous parametric down-
converter (SPDC) source, with phase-matching band-
width W and brightness (average photon number/s-Hz)
NS ≪ 1, transmits the signal beam to Bob over a fiber
link of transmissivity κS ≪ 1, and stores her idler beam
in a fiber loop of transmissivity κI ; (2) Bob uses R bps
BPSK to encode his message and an erbium-doped fiber
amplifier (EDFA) of gain GB ≫ 1 and ASE output noise
of brightness NB = GB to mask his message; and (3)
Alice recovers Bob’s message with the best known re-
ceiver for that task, viz., the optical parametric ampli-
fier (OPA) receiver [10]. The OPA receiver requires Al-
ice to store her idler for a time equal to the roundtrip
propagation delay between Alice and Bob, making κI =
κ2S . The error probability of Alice’s receiver then sat-
isfies Pr(e)OPAAlice ∼ exp(−2Wκ3SGBNS/RNB)/2, assum-
ing ideal equipment [9, 11]. In contrast, Eve’s passive-
eavesdropping error probability for her (realization un-
known) optimum quantum receiver obeys Pr(e)optEve ∼
exp(−4WκSGBN2S/RNB)/2 [7, 11], assuming that she
collects all the light lost en route between Alice and
Bob. The κ3SNS versus κSN
2
S disparity between Al-
ice and Eve’s error exponents provides Alice and Bob
with direct-communication security against this passive-
eavesdropping individual attack when the former sub-
stantially exceeds the latter [12]. Alice’s NS versus N
2
S
advantage derives from the maximally-entangled nature
of the phase-sensitive cross correlation between the signal
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FIG. 1: (color online). Setups for QI-secured direct communi-
cation in the presence of passive eavesdropping. In the proto-
col from [7], Alice’s source is a continuous-wave spontaneous
parametric downconverter whose signal she sends to Bob and
whose idler she retains as a reference for the optical paramet-
ric amplifier receiver from [10]. For the new protocol, Alice
employs a source of amplified spontaneous emission noise to
send a low-brightness signal to Bob while retaining a high-
brightness copy for use as the local oscillator in a broadband
balanced-homodyne receiver.
and idler emitted by her SPDC source, while her κ3S ver-
sus κS disadvantage is due to her needing an idler-storage
fiber that is twice as long as the Alice-to-Bob fiber.
An alternative QI architecture that avoids this idler-
loss scaling was introduced in [9]. It replaces Bob’s
single-channel BPSK modulator with K independent
dense wavelength-division multiplexed (DWDM) BPSK
modulators that encode rate Rc bps data on nonover-
lapping WcHz slices of the signal spectrum, and it re-
places Alice’s OPA receiver with K DWDM homodyne
receivers for the matching spectral bands of her idler
and the light returned to her from Bob. Because ho-
modyne detection of the idler can be done immediately,
with delay-locking performed post-detection, Alice’s er-
ror probability for each DWDM channel is given by
Pr(e)DWDMAlice ∼ exp(−WcκSGBNS/RcNB)/2 with ideal
equipment [9, 11]. Unfortunately, the implementation
burden for this architecture is overwhelming: 50 DWDM
channels with Wc = 40GHz bandwidth would be needed
to fully populate a W = 2THz phase-matching band-
width, and each of those channels would need a high-
speed analog-to-digital converter to retain the informa-
tion required to realize the error probability given above.
Thus, the DWDM architecture is not a satisfactory so-
lution to the idler-storage problem. In its stead we pro-
pose replacing Alice’s SPDC source with an ASE source
(e.g., an EDFA), and her OPA receiver with a broad-
band (single-channel) balanced-homodyne receiver. The
ASE source’s high brightness permits a low-brightness
portion of its output to be sent to Bob; such light can
perfectly mimic what Bob (and a passively eavesdropping
Eve) would see were Alice to have used an SPDC source.
However, because Alice now retains high-brightness ASE
light that is perfectly correlated with what she is send-
ing to Bob, fiber-spool storage for the roundtrip delay
is no longer problematic, i.e., she can use optical am-
plifiers in her storage system with insignificant error-
exponent (signal-to-noise ratio) penalty [13]. Moreover,
this bright stored light is exactly what is needed as the
local oscillator (LO) for broadband homodyne reception
of the light returned by Bob. Now, Alice’s error prob-
ability, with ideal equipment, is given by Pr(e)ASEAlice ∼
exp(−WκSGBNS/RNB)/2 [11, 13], while the passive-
eavesdropping Eve’s optimum quantum receiver’s perfor-
mance is still Pr(e)optEve ∼ exp(−4WκSGBN2S/RNB)/2.
Comparing the asymptotic expressions for Pr(e)OPAAlice and
Pr(e)ASEAlice reveals that the latter loses a factor of two in
its error exponent compared to the former, but gains
a much larger benefit by virtue of its immunity to the
idler-storage loss that plagues the SPDC-based system.
Another benefit afforded by Alice’s switching to an ASE
source is that she can optimize her secure rate by choos-
ing the brightness of the signal light she sends to Bob
over a much wider range than is available from an SPDC
source. This is because the bulk-optics cw SPDC sources
that produce maximally-entangled signal and idler out-
puts are generally limited to NS ≤ 10−3, but commer-
cial EDFAs can yield output brightness as high as 104,
from which any desired NS ≤ 1 signal brightness is eas-
ily obtained. We also note that the upper bound from
[8] on Eve’s passive-eavesdropping Holevo information as
a function of Alice’s NS also applies, unchanged, when
Alice uses an ASE source.
Figure 2(a) compares QI’s secure-rate-versus-distance
performance when Alice uses the ASE-source/homodyne-
receiver setup proposed herein, in lieu of the SPDC-
source/OPA-receiver configuration from [7], and a
passive-eavesdropping Eve mounts an optimum collec-
tive attack. The curves therein are secure-rate lower
bounds for the SPDC and ASE systems obtained from
∆ILBAB = βIAB − χUBEB , where IAB is Alice and Bob’s
Shannon information rate, χUBEB is an upper bound on
Eve’s Holevo information rate, and β is the efficiency
of the error-correcting code employed by Alice and Bob
[13]. Both curves assume that: (1) Alice and Bob are con-
nected by fibers with 0.2 dB/km loss; (2) Alice’s source
has 2THz bandwidth; (3) the brightness NS of the signal
light Alice sends to Bob and the bit rate R ≤ 10Gbps of
Bob’s BSPK modulator are chosen to maximize ∆ILBAB ;
(4) Bob’s amplifier has gain GB = 10
4 and output ASE
with brightness NB = 10
4; and (5) Eve collects all light
lost en route between Alice and Bob. For the SPDC/OPA
system, Alice stores her idler in fiber with 0.2 dB/km
loss, and she chooses her OPA’s gain GA—in conjunction
with her NS and Bob’s R—to maximize ∆I
LB
AB . Her re-
ceiver’s photodetector quantum efficiency is 0.9, its band-
width is sufficient to accommodate 10GHz BPSK, and
β = 1 is assumed. For the ASE/homodyne system, Al-
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FIG. 2: (color online). (a) Lower bounds on Alice and
Bob’s secure rates when Eve mounts a collective passive-
eavesdropping attack. (b) Signal brightness, NS , at which
these secure rates are realized. See text for additional details.
ice’s reference—i.e., her NLO = 10
4 brightness LO—is
presumed to be stored without degradation, her homo-
dyne receiver’s efficiency is 0.9 [14], and its bandwidth is
sufficient for 10GHz BPSK. In addition, her error prob-
ability is constrained to satisfy Pr(e)ASEAlice ≤ 0.1, making
her β = 0.94 achievable at Pr(e)ASEAlice = 0.1 with a rate-
1/2 low-density parity-check code [15]. All other aspects
of both systems are ideal.
There are several points worthy of note regarding the
results shown in Fig. 2(a). The first is a reminder that
Alice and Bob’s passive-eavesdropping immunity applies
to QSDC, in addition to QKD. The second is that ob-
viating Alice’s storage loss by use of ASE light provides
an enormous increase in secure-rate-versus-distance per-
formance. Indeed, the ASE/homodyne system is capable
of a 3.5Gbps secure rate over 50 km of low-loss fiber,
whereas the SPDC/OPA system’s secure rate is about
103-times lower at that distance. A third, more funda-
mental, point concerns the physical basis for this pas-
sive eavesdropping immunity. Prior work ascribed QI’s
passive-eavesdropping immunity to the entanglement be-
tween the signal and idler beams produced by Alice’s
SPDC source [7–9], making its experimental demonstra-
tion the first realized example of entanglement’s bene-
fit surviving an entanglement-breaking channel. Alice’s
switching to an ASE source to provide both her low-
brightness signal and high-brightness local oscillator im-
plies that entanglement is not necessary to realize im-
munity to passive eavesdropping. With the ASE source,
security now rests on the no-cloning theorem, i.e., Eve
is unable to obtain a high-brightness version of the sig-
nal light Alice sends to Bob with which to make her
own high-quality homodyne measurement of Bob’s mes-
sage. Finally, we point out that, over the path lengths
shown, the optimum R ≤ 10Gbps value without the
Pr(e)Alice ≤ 0.1 constraint is 10Gbps. Thus the abrupt
slope change in Fig. 2(a)’s ASE/homodyne curve occurs
when R must be reduced to satisfy that constraint. It
follows that Alice and Bob’s secure-rate/distance region
can be increased if both the modulation rate and error-
probability constraints are relaxed, as could be done with
advances in modulator technology and further develop-
ment of high-efficiency error-correcting codes.
Now let us return to the issue of defeating an active
attack. Our proposal for defeating such attacks is shown
in Fig. 3. Alice passively combines signal light from
a bandwidth W , brightness NSPDC SPDC source with
light from highly-attenuated, bandwidth W ASE source
in a 1:99 ratio, resulting in a bandwidth W , brightness
NS signal beam that she sends to Bob. Alice uses a
single-photon counter to detect photons from her SPDC
source’s idler beam, and retains her bright ASE light for
use as a broadband homodyne LO. Because Alice and
Bob will be monitoring the power levels and power spec-
tra at their respective terminals, Eve minimizes her ex-
posure and maximizes her Holevo information by: (1)
replacing the 0.2 dB/km fibers connecting Alice and Bob
with her own lossless fibers; (2) injecting signal light from
an SPDC source identical to Alice’s into the Alice-to-Bob
channel through a beam splitter, while preserving the
power level and spectrum seen by Bob; and (3) withdraw-
ing some light from the Bob-to-Alice channel through an-
other beam splitter, while preserving the power level and
spectrum seen by Alice. Alice and Bob’s security rests on:
(1) their measuring the singles rates for Alice’s detection
of SPDC idler photons and Bob’s detection of photons he
has tapped from the light he received from Alice; and (2)
their monitoring the coincidence rate for these measure-
ments. That coincidence rate is degraded, relative to the
singles rates, by Eve’s light injection. In particular, Al-
ice and Bob’s singles (SA and SB) and coincidence (CAB)
rates obey [13] SA = ηNSDPCW , SB = ηκBκSNSW , and
CAB = SASBTg + η
2κBfκSκANSPDCW . Here: η is the
detection efficiency of Alice and Bob’s monitors; κA ∼ 0.9
is the fraction of Alice’s SPDC signal light that is coupled
into the fiber going to Bob; κS = 10
−0.02L is the trans-
missivity of the L-km-long fibers connecting Alice and
Bob; κB = 0.1 is the fraction of the light Bob receives
that he routes to his monitor; Tg = 100ps is the gate
time of Alice and Bob’s monitors; and f is the fraction
of the light received by Bob that came from Alice.
Figure 4(a) shows a lower bound on Alice and Bob’s
secure rate, ∆ILBAB = βIAB −χUBEB, in the presence of the
active-eavesdropping Eve [16] when their monitoring en-
sures that f = 0.99. Also included is a brightness plot
for the light Alice sends to Bob. These curves were ob-
tained assuming that: (1) the brightness of the signal
Alice sends to Bob and Bob’s bit rate R ≤ 10Gbps are
chosen to maximize their secure rate subject to the con-
straint that Pr(e)Alice ≤ 0.1 so that β = 0.94 can be as-
sumed; (2) Alice’s homodyne receiver has an undegraded
local oscillator with brightness NLO = 10
4 and efficiency
0.9; and (3) all other system aspects are ideal. We see
that 2Gbps QKD is possible at 50 km range.
At this juncture, there are two points worth discussing.
First, there is a major distinction to be drawn between
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FIG. 3: (color online). Setup for defeating active eavesdrop-
ping by coincidence monitoring.
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FIG. 4: (color online). (a) Lower bound on Alice and Bob’s se-
cure rate when Eve mounts a collective active-eavesdropping
attack, and the signal brightness, NS , at which this bound is
realized. See text for additional details. (b) Secure rate in
bits per mode versus one-way path loss: comparison between
the Takeoka-Guha-Wilde (TGW) bound, ideal continuous-
variable (CV) QKD, and the ASE/homodyne protocol from
Fig. 3 whose performance (in bits/sec) is shown in (a).
the active and passive cases. It will take a time TM for
Alice and Bob to verify, from their measured singles and
coincidence rates, that Eve’s intrusion does not violate
f ≥ 0.99. Thus QSDC operation is not possible unless
Bob stores his modulated and amplified light for a TM -
duration interval prior to sending it to Alice, because he
must ensure that the channel is safe to use for QSDC
before he transmits his message. At a 50 km Alice-to-
Bob path length, we have found TM ∼ 1 s [13], making
Bob’s optical storage out of the question with current
technology. Absent a breakthrough in wideband, long-
lived quantum memory, our approach to defeating active
eavesdropping therefore restricts Alice and Bob to using
their system for QKD [17]. That said, their secure rate
at 50km is orders of magnitude beyond what is possible
with other QKD protocols, making it fast enough to sup-
port one-time pad file encryption. The second point of
note concerns the degree to which the active attack we
have considered is the most powerful one that Eve could
mount. We can show that Eve’s use of an SPDC source
is her best beam-splitter active attack for a 3-mode χUBEB
when NS ≪ 1 in that it nearly saturates the bound set
by the entanglement-assisted Holevo capacity [18]. The
same is true, without the NS ≪ 1 restriction, for a two-
mode active attack in which Eve ignores the light tapped
from the Alice-to-Bob channel [18].
Finally, it behooves to consider how close our pro-
tocol might come to an ultimate limit. Takeoka et
al . [19] have shown that a two-way protocol for ei-
ther QSDC or QKD that is carried out over a channel
whose one-way transmissivity is κS has its bits/mode se-
cure rate bounded above by 2 log2[(1 + κS)/(1 − κS)].
It is not known, however, whether this bound is attain-
able. The highest known achievable bits/mode secure
rate is the − log2(1−κS) rate of ideal continuous-variable
QKD [20, 21]. Figure 4(b) compares these rates with
the bits/mode behavior of our ASE/homodyne system,
whose bits/mode equals its bits/s divided byW , because
operation is through single-mode fiber. We see that there
is a substantial gap between our protocol’s bits/mode
performance and the ultimate limit. Nevertheless, our
protocol’s bits/s performance is orders of magnitude bet-
ter than any existing QKD protocol because its modes/s
value is set by the phase-matching bandwidth W ∼THz,
whereas both continuous-variable and discrete-variable
QKD protocols have modes/s values set by electrical
bandwidths that are ∼GHz, unless wavelength-division
multiplexing (WDM) is employed. WDM can also be ap-
plied advantageously to our protocol, however, enabling
it to maximize its overall secure rate—beyond what we
have found for single-channel system—by operating each
wavelength channel at the limit of BPSK-modulator and
EDFA technology with the Pr(e)Alice = 0.1 value needed
for high-efficiency error correction.
In conclusion, we have shown how a new two-way pro-
tocol for secure communication can overcome the QI
protocol’s problem of idler-storage loss limiting its rate-
versus-distance capability against a passive eavesdrop-
per, and how our protocol’s addition of coincidence-
based channel monitoring can defeat active eavesdrop-
ping. In doing so we found that entanglement is not
essential to passive eavesdropping immunity: Eve’s in-
ability to clone a low-brightness thermal-state signal
beam suffices. Most importantly, our new protocol af-
fords unprecedented rate-versus-distance QSDC capabil-
ity against a passive eavesdropper and a similar QKD
capability against an active eavesdropper. In both cases
the parameter values we have assumed for our sources,
optical amplifiers, photodetectors, and error-correcting
codes are achievable with available technology.
This research was supported by ONR grant num-
ber N00014-13-1-0774, AFOSR grant number FA9550-
14-1-0052, and the DARPA Quiness Program through
U.S. Army Research Office Grant number W31P4Q-12-
1-0019.
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PASSIVE EAVESDROPPING SETUPS
Figure 5 reprises the setups for our passive-eavesdropping analyses of the quantum illumination (QI) protocol from
[7] and the new protocol.
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FIG. 5: Setups for QI-secured direct communication in the presence of passive eavesdropping. In the protocol from [7], Alice’s
source is a continuous-wave spontaneous parametric downconverter whose signal she sends to Bob and whose idler she retains
as a reference for the optical parametric amplifier receiver from [10]. For the new protocol, Alice employs a source of amplified
spontaneous emission noise to send a low-brightness signal to Bob while retaining a high-brightness copy for use as the local
oscillator in a broadband balanced-homodyne receiver.
For the QI version of this setup, Alice uses a spontaneous parametric downconverter (SPDC) source that emits
M = TW independent, identically-distributed, signal-idler mode pairs in each T = 1/R duration bit interval with
photon annihilation operators { (aˆSm , aˆIm) : 1 ≤ m ≤ M }, where W is the SPDC’s phase-matching bandwidth and
R is Bob’s modulation rate. Each such mode pair is in a zero-mean, maximally-entangled Gaussian state, i.e., a
two-mode squeezed-vacuum state, that is characterized by its Wigner covariance matrix [7],
ΛSI =
1
4


2NS + 1 0 2
√
NS(NS + 1) 0
0 2NS + 1 0 −2
√
NS(NS + 1)
2
√
NS(NS + 1) 0 2NS + 1 0
0 −2
√
NS(NS + 1) 0 2NS + 1

 , (1)
where NS ≪ 1. For the new protocol, Alice uses an amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) source to obtainM = TW
independent, identically-distributed, signal-reference mode pairs in each bit interval with photon annihilation operators
{ (aˆSm , aˆRm) : 1 ≤ m ≤M }. The modes in each pair are in completely-correlated thermal states that are characterized
by the Wigner covariance matrix,
ΛSR =
1
4


2NS + 1 0 2
√
NSNLO 0
0 2NS + 1 0 2
√
NSNLO
2
√
NSNLO 0 2NLO + 1 0
0 2
√
NSNLO 0 2NLO + 1

 , (2)
of their joint state, where NS ≤ 1≪ NLO.
In either case, propagation of the {aˆSm} modes to Bob is through a pure-loss fiber channel with transmissivity κS ,
so that the modes he receives have annihilation operators
aˆ′Sm =
√
κS aˆSm +
√
1− κS vˆSm . (3)
where the noise modes {vˆSm} are in their vacuum states. Bob imposes his message bit, k = 0 or 1, on the {aˆ′Sm} via
binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) modulation and then amplifies the modulated modes with an erbium-doped fiber
6amplifier (EDFA) with gain GB and output ASE NB. The modes that Bob then transmits to Alice therefore have
photon annihilation operators
aˆBm = (−1)k
√
GB aˆ
′
Sm +
√
GB − 1 nˆ†Bm , (4)
where the noise modes {nˆBm} are in independent, identically-distributed, thermal states with 〈nˆBm nˆ†Bm〉 = NB/(GB−
1). Propagation back to Alice through a pure-loss fiber channel with transmissivity κS results in a collection of return
modes with photon annihilation operators given by
aˆ′Bm =
√
κS aˆBm +
√
1− κS vˆBm , (5)
where the noise modes {vˆBm} are in their vacuum states.
For the QI setup, the idler modes are stored in a pure-loss fiber spool—with transmissivity κI = κ
2
S , yielding
aˆ′Im =
√
κI aˆIm +
√
1− κI vˆIm , (6)
where the noise modes {vˆIm} are in their vacuum states. The {aˆ′Im} and the {aˆ′Bm} are applied as inputs to an optical
parametric amplifier (OPA) whose idler-mode outputs,
aˆoutm =
√
GA aˆ
′
Im +
√
GA − 1 aˆ
′†
Bm
, for 1 ≤ m ≤M , (7)
are measured by quantum-efficiency η direct detection of their photon flux over the bit interval. Alice then decides
on the value of Bob’s message bit by comparing the outcome of that
NˆOPA =
M∑
m=1
aˆ
′†
outm aˆ
′
outm (8)
measurement with a threshold value chosen to equalize her false-alarm and miss probabilities [8, 22]. If the outcome
exceeds that threshold she decides Bob sent k = 0, otherwise she decides that he sent k = 1. Here, we have accounted
for the detector’s quantum efficiency by defining
aˆ′outm =
√
η aˆoutm +
√
1− η vˆoutm , (9)
where the noise modes {vˆoutm} are in their vacuum states.
For the new ASE-based protocol, Alice detects the {aˆ′Bm} modes using a balanced-homodyne arrangement and
decides on the value of Bob’s bit by comparing the outcome of that
Nˆhom =
M∑
m=1
(
aˆ
′†
+maˆ
′
+m − aˆ
′†
−maˆ
′
−m
)
(10)
measurement with zero. She decides that Bob sent k = 0 if the measurement outcome exceeds zero, and she decides
k = 1 otherwise [23]. In this expression,
aˆ′±m =
√
η
(
aˆ′Bm ± aˆ′Rm√
2
)
+
√
1− η vˆ±m , (11)
where η is now the homodyne detector’s efficiency, i.e., the product of its mode-mixing and quantum efficiencies, and
the noise modes {vˆ±m} are in their vacuum states.
The reference modes, {aˆRm}, undergo optical amplification, with gain GR = 1/κI and output ASE NR = GR, prior
to being stored in a fiber spool. That spool, which has transmissivity κI , has its length chosen so that its output will
be delay matched to the light Alice receives from Bob, resulting in
aˆ′Rm =
√
κI
(√
GRaˆRm +
√
GR − 1 nˆ†Rm
)
+
√
1− κI vˆRm , (12)
with the noise modes {vˆRm} being in their vacuum states, and the noise modes {nˆRm} being in independent, identically-
distributed, thermal states with 〈nˆRm nˆ†Rm〉 = NR/(GR − 1). For NLO ≫ 1, this amplify-then-store procedure leaves
the average photon number of the reference almost unchanged and it preserves nearly-complete correlation between
the stored reference and the signal beam that Alice sent to Bob. In particular, before storage we have that
〈aˆ†Rm aˆRm〉 = NLO, (13)
7and
|〈aˆ†Sm aˆRm〉|2
〈aˆ†Sm aˆSm〉〈aˆ
†
Rm
aˆRm〉
= 1, (14)
while after storage we find that
〈aˆ′†Rm aˆ′Rm〉 = κIGRNLO + κINR = NLO + 1 ≈ NLO, (15)
and
|〈aˆ†Sm aˆ′Rm〉|2
〈aˆ†Sm aˆSm〉〈aˆ
′†
Rm
aˆ′Rm〉
=
κIGRNSNLO
NS(κIGRNLO + κINR)
=
NLO
NLO + 1
≈ 1 (16)
when NLO ≫ 1 [24].
ACTIVE EAVESDROPPING SETUP
Figure 6 reprises the setup for our active eavesdropping analysis. Now, Alice uses both SPDC and ASE sources. For
each bit interval, the SPDC source producesM signal-idler mode pairs, with annihilation operators { (aˆSPDCSm , aˆSPDCIm ) :
1 ≤ m ≤M }, that are in independent, identically-distributed, zero-mean jointly Gaussian states that are characterized
by the Wigner covariance matrix
ΛSPDCSI =
1
4


2NSPDC + 1 0 CSPDC 0
0 2NSPDC + 1 0 −CSPDC
CSPDC 0 2NSPDC + 1 0
0 −CSPDC 0 2NSPDC + 1

 , (17)
where NSPDC ≪ 1 and CSPDC = 2
√
NSPDC(NSPDC + 1). For each bit interval, the ASE source produces M signal-
reference mode pairs, with annihilation operators { (aˆASESm , aˆASERm ) : 1 ≤ m ≤M }, that are in independent, identically-
distribution, completely-correlated thermal states that are characterized by the Wigner covariance matrix,
ΛASESR =
1
4


2NASE + 1 0 2
√
NASENLO 0
0 2NASE + 1 0 2
√
NASENLO
2
√
NASENLO 0 2NLO + 1 0
0 2
√
NASENLO 0 2NLO + 1

 , (18)
where NASE = 1≪ NLO.
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FIG. 6: Setup for defeating active eavesdropping by coincidence monitoring.
8Alice sends her SPDC’s idler beam to her channel monitor, and combines her SPDC and ASE source’s signal beams
on an asymmetric beam splitter and transmits the output modes,
aˆSm =
√
κA aˆ
SPDC
Sm +
√
1− κA aˆASESm , (19)
to Bob. Because she wants each of these output modes to have average photon number NS ≤ 1, and she wants 99%
of the light going to Bob to come from her ASE source, Alice uses κA = 1− 0.99NS and adjusts her downconverter’s
pump power to obtain NSPDC = NS/100(1 − 0.99NS). Note that for NS ≤ 0.1 these choices imply κA ≥ 0.9. It
follows that the signal modes Alice sends to Bob, her SPDC idler modes, and her ASE reference modes—denoted
{ (aˆSm , aˆIm , aˆRm) : 1 ≤ m ≤M }—are independent, identically-distributed, mode triples. Each such mode triple is in
a zero-mean Gaussian state that is completely characterized by the Wigner covariance matrix
ΛSIR =
1
4


2NS + 1 0
√
κACSPDC 0 CASE 0
0 2NS + 1 0 −√κA CSPDC 0 CASE√
κACSPDC 0 2NSPDC + 1 0 0 0
0 −√κA CSPDC 0 2NSPDC + 1 0 0
CASE 0 0 0 2NLO + 1 0
0 CASE 0 0 0 2NLO + 1


, (20)
where CASE = 2
√
(1− κA)NASENLO.
Eve replaces the lossy fibers that had connected Alice and Bob with lossless fibers into which she has inserted beam
splitters with transmissivities κAB for the Alice-to-Bob channel and κBA for the Bob-to-Alice channel. She has her
own SPDC source (with the same phase-matching bandwidth as Alice’s), whose M signal-idler pairs are independent
and identically distributed with each mode pair, (aˆEveSm , aˆ
Eve
Im
), being in a zero-mean, maximally-entangled Gaussian
state characterized by the Wigner covariance matrix,
ΛEveSI =
1
4


2NEve + 1 0 2
√
NEve(NEve + 1) 0
0 2NEve + 1 0 −2
√
NEve(NEve + 1)
2
√
NEve(NEve + 1) 0 2NEve + 1 0
0 −2
√
NEve(NEve + 1) 0 2NEve + 1

 . (21)
Eve injects her SPDC’s signal beam into the Alice-to-Bob channel through her κAB beam splitter, so that the mth-
mode signal light that Bob receives has annihilation operator
aˆ′Sm =
√
κAB aˆSm +
√
1− κAB aˆEveSm , (22)
and she taps light from the Bob-to-Alice channel via her κBA beam splitter, so that the mth-mode return light that
Alice receives has annihilation operator
aˆ′Bm =
√
κBA aˆBm +
√
1− κBA vˆBAm , (23)
where the noise mode vˆBAm is in its vacuum state. Now, because Bob uses a transmissivity-κB beam splitter to divert
part of the light he receives from Alice to his channel monitor, aˆBm in Eq. (23) is given by
aˆBm = (−1)k
√
GB
[√
1− κB aˆ′Sm +
√
κB vˆ
′
Bm
]
+
√
GB − 1 nˆ†Bm , (24)
instead of by Eq. (5), with the noise mode vˆ′Bm being in its vacuum state.
Eve attempts to determine the full string of bits that Bob has sent by joint measurement of the light she taps from
the Alice-to-Bob channel,
aˆEveABm =
√
1− κAB aˆSm −
√
κAB aˆ
Eve
Sm , (25)
her retained idler modes {aˆEveIm }, and the light she taps from the Bob-to-Alice channel,
aˆEveBAm =
√
1− κBA aˆBm −
√
κBA vˆBAm , (26)
9carried out over all Bob’s transmitted bits.
Bob uses a beam splitter (whose free input-port modes are in their vacuum states) to divert a fraction κB of the
light he receives to his channel monitor, sending the rest to his BPSK modulator and EDFA for transmission back
to Alice. To minimize the detectability of her attack, Eve chooses NEve, κAB, and κBA so that: (1) Bob receives an
average photon number κSNS , just as he did in Eve’s absence; (2) the fraction, 1− f , of light entering Bob’s terminal
that is due to Eve’s injection is 0.01; and (3) Alice receives an average photon number κS [GB(1 − κB)κSNS +NB],
just as she did in Eve’s absence. These objectives are satisfied when κABNS + (1 − κAB)NEve = κSNS , f ≡
1 − (1 − κAB)NEve/κSNS = 0.99, and κBA = κS . Alice makes her decision about Bob’s message bit by comparing
the outcome of her homodyne measurement—as described in Sec. I—with zero, and deciding that Bob sent k = 0 if
the measurement outcome exceeds zero and deciding k = 1 otherwise.
ALICE’S ERROR PROBABILITIES AND ALICE AND BOB’S SHANNON INFORMATION RATES
BecauseM ≥ 200 for all the performance evaluations presented in the paper, we can use the Central Limit Theorem
to justify the following Gaussian-approximation formulas for Alice’s error probabilities [8] when Bob’s bit value is
equally likely to be 0 or 1 and Eve mounts a passive attack against an SPDC/OPA system or an ASE/homodyne
system:
Pr(e)OPAAlice = Q
(
µOPA0 − µOPA1
σOPA0 + σ
OPA
1
)
, (27)
Pr(e)ASEAlice = Q
(
µASE0 − µASE1
σASE0 + σ
ASE
1
)
, (28)
where
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
dt
e−t
2/2
√
2pi
. (29)
Here, µOPAk and σ
OPA
k are the conditional mean and conditional standard deviation of the NˆOPA measurement given
the value of Bob’s message bit, k, when Eve makes a passive attack. Likewise µASEk and σ
ASE
k are the conditional
mean and conditional standard deviation of the Nˆhom measurement given the value of Bob’s message bit, k, when Eve
makes a passive attack. A similar Gaussian-approximation formula applies when Bob’s bit values are equally likely
to be 0 or 1 and Eve makes an active attack:
Pr(e)actAlice = Q
(
µact0 − µact1
σact0 + σ
act
1
)
, (30)
with µactk and σ
act
k being the conditional mean and conditional standard deviation of the Nˆhom measurement given
the value of Bob’s message bit, k, when Eve makes an active attack and Alice and Bob perform channel monitoring.
Once Alice’s error probabilities are found, Alice and Bob’s Shannon-information rates (in bps) follow immediately
from
IAB = R{1 + Pr(e)Alice log2[Pr(e)Alice] + (1 − Pr(e)Alice) log2[1− Pr(e)Alice]}, (31)
hence all that remains is to determine the conditional means and standard deviations needed to instantiate our
error-probability formulas. These conditional moments are easily calculated from the state characterizations and
annihilation-operator transformations in the first two sections of this Supplemental Material, so we will merely present
the results. For passive eavesdropping on the SPDC/OPA system we have
µOPAk =Mη {GAκINS + (GA − 1)[κS(GBκSNS +NB) + 1]
+ 2(−1)k
√
GA(GA − 1)κIκ2SGBNS(NS + 1)
}
, (32)
σOPAk =
√
µOPAk (µ
OPA
k /M + 1), (33)
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while for passive eavesdropping on the ASE/homodyne system we have
µASEk = 2(−1)kMηκS
√
GBNSNLO, (34)
σASEk =
√
M{η(κ2SGBNS + κSNB +NLO) + 2η2(2κ2SGBNS + κSNB)NLO}, (35)
where perfect reference storage has been assumed [25]. At this point we can obtain the asymptotic (NB, NLO ≫ 1)
form of Pr(e)ASEAlice(e) that was used for illustrative purposes in the paper, albeit not in the performance-evaluation
figures. In this asymptotic regime we have that
σASEk −→
√
2Mη2κSNBNLO, (36)
whence
Pr(e)ASEAlice −→ Q
(√
2MκSGBNS/NB
)
≤ exp(−WκSGBNS/RNB)/2, (37)
where we have used the well-known bound Q(x) ≤ exp(−x2/2)/2 for x ≥ 0, and M = W/R. In the paper, this
asymptotic expression was quoted for ideal equipment, which presumes unity homodyne efficiency (η = 1). The
derivation we have just given verifies that in this asymptotic regime Pr(e)actAlice is not sensitive to the homodyne
efficiency. Thus the η = 0.9 homodyne efficiency assumed in the paper is not a critical value.
For active eavesdropping on the ASE/homodyne system with channel monitoring we have the
µactk = 2(−1)kMη
√
κBAGB(1 − κB)κAB(1− κA)NASENLO, (38)
σactk =
√
M{η[NactR +NLO] + 2η2[NactR NLO + κBAGB(1− κB)κAB(1− κA)NASENLO]}, (39)
where NactR = κBAGB(1− κB)κSNS + κBANB and perfect reference storage has been assumed [25].
UPPER BOUNDS ON EVE’S HOLEVO INFORMATION RATES
For any of our configurations—passive eavesdropping on the SPDC/OPA system, passive eavesdropping on the
ASE/homodyne system, and active eavesdropping on the ASE/homodyne system with channel monitoring—Eve’s
Holevo information rate is given by
χEB =
[
S(ρE)−
1∑
k=0
S(ρ
(k)
E )/2
]
R, (40)
where S(·) denotes von Neumann entropy, ρ(k)E is Eve’s conditional joint density operator for the modes she collects
that are associated with a single message bit from Bob when that bit’s value is k, and ρE =
∑1
k=0 ρ
(k)
E /2 is her
unconditional joint density operator for those modes. To place an upper bound on χEB we will follow the procedure
used in [8, 9] for the passive eavesdropping attack. There, because the conditional joint density operators were Gaussian
states, their von Neumann entropies were evaluated exactly by symplectic diagonalization of the conditional Wigner
covariances Λ
(k)
E [26]. The unconditional joint density operator, however, was not a Gaussian state, but it was zero-
mean with a diagonal Wigner covariance matrix ΛE =
∑1
k=0 Λ
(k)
E /2, meaning that all its modes were uncorrelated.
The joint state with that covariance matrix which has the highest von Neumann entropy is a collection of independent
thermal states whose average photon numbers are directly related to those diagonal elements. Moreover, Bob’s R bps
information rate is an upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information rate, i.e., she cannot glean more information than
what Bob sends. Taken together, these results lead to the following upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information rate
for the passive eavesdropping attack [8, 9]:
χUBEB = min
[
Stherm(ΛE)−
1∑
k=0
S(ρ
(k)
E )/2, 1
]
R, (41)
where Stherm(ΛE) is the von Neumann entropy of a multi-mode thermal state with covariance matrix ΛE .
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For the passive eavesdropping configurations considered in the present paper, Eve collects all the light lost
in propagation between Alice and Bob, i.e., for each of Bob’s message bits she has access to M mode pairs,
{ (aˆEveABm , aˆEveBAm) : 1 ≤ m ≤ M }. Given Bob’s bit value is k, these mode pairs are in independent, identically-
distributed, zero-mean Gaussian states, implying that
S(ρ
(k)
E ) =MS(ρ
(k)
E ), (42)
where ρ
(k)
E is the common conditional joint-density operator for a mode pair. That mode-pair conditional density
operator is completely characterized by the Wigner covariance matrix
Λ
(k)
AB =
1
4


2(1− κS)NS + 1 0 (−1)kCpassAB 0
0 2(1− κS)NS + 1 0 (−1)kCpassAB
(−1)kCpassAB 0 2NpassBA + 1 0
0 (−1)kCpassAB 0 2NpassBA + 1

 , (43)
where CpassAB = 2(1− κS)
√
GBκS NS and N
pass
BA = (1− κS)(GBκSNS +NB). Moreover, averaging over Bob’s equally-
likely message-bit distribution, we have that ρE has a 4M × 4M Wigner covariance matrix that is block diagonal
with common 4× 4 blocks on its diagonal that are themselves diagonal and given by
ΛAB =
1∑
k=0
Λ
(k)
AB/2 =
1
4
diag
[
2(1− κS)NS + 1 2(1− κS)NS + 1 2NpassBA + 1 2NpassBA + 1
]
. (44)
With these covariance matrices in hand, the procedure from [8, 9] that was described above can be used to evaluate
the χUBEB result from Eq. (41).
The process to evaluate χUBEB for an active attack is slightly more complicated, because for each of Bob’s message
bits Eve now has access toM mode triples, { (aˆEveABm , aˆEveIm , aˆEveBAm) : 1 ≤ m ≤M }. Given Bob’s bit value, k, these mode
triples are in independent, identically-distributed, zero-mean Gaussian states that are characterized by the Wigner
covariance matrix,
Λ
(k)
AIB =
1
4


2NactAB + 1 0 −CactAI 0 (−1)kCactAB 0
0 2NactAB + 1 0 C
act
AI 0 (−1)kCactAB
−CactAI 0 2NEve + 1 0 (−1)kCactIB 0
0 CactAI 0 2NEve + 1 0 (−1)k+1CactIB
(−1)kCactAB 0 (−1)kCactIB 0 2NactBA + 1 0
0 (−1)kCactAB 0 (−1)k+1CactIB 0 2NactBA + 1


, (45)
where
NactAB = [(1− κAB)NS + κABNEve], (46)
CactAI = 2
√
κABNEve(NEve + 1), (47)
CactAB = 2
√
(1 − κBA)GB(1− κB)(1 − κAB)κAB (NS −NEve), (48)
CactIB = 2
√
(1 − κBA)GB(1− κB)(1 − κAB)NEve(NEve + 1), (49)
NactBA = (1− κBA)[GB(1− κB)κSNS +NB]. (50)
The conditional von Neumann entropies that we need are obtained by symplectic diagonalization of the Λ
(k)
AIB. Aver-
aging over Bob’s equally-likely message-bit distribution, we have that ρE has a 6M × 6M Wigner covariance matrix
that is block diagonal with common 6× 6 blocks on its diagonal given by
ΛAIB =
1∑
k=0
Λ
(k)
AIB/2 =
1
4


2NactAB + 1 0 −CactAI 0 0 0
0 2NactAB + 1 0 C
act
AI 0 0
−CactAI 0 2NEve + 1 0 0 0
0 CactAI 0 2NEve + 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 2NactBA + 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 2NactBA + 1


. (51)
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This covariance matrix indicates that the aˆEveABm and aˆ
Eve
Im
modes have a phase-sensitive cross correlation, but they
are both uncorrelated with the aˆEveBAm mode. Performing a symplectic diagonalization of the submatrix associated
with the correlated modes, we can obtain the average photon numbers of three uncorrelated modes, the sum of whose
thermal-state von Neumann entropies is an upper bound on S(ρE). In this manner we can complete evaluating the
χUBEB result from Eq. (41) for the active attack.
CHANNEL MONITORING
Alice and Bob use channel monitoring—measuring their singles rates, SA and SB, and their coincidence rate, CAB,
to constrain the fraction of light entering Bob that comes from Eve’s active attack. Their monitors will be assumed to
have detectors with quantum efficiencies η and jitter-limited coincidence-gate times Tg ∼ 100 ps. When the average
number of photons illuminating each monitor in a gate time is much smaller than one—as will be the case for our
performance evaluation—the average values of the preceding rates can be taken to be [27]
SK =
η
Tg
∫ Tg
0
dt 〈Eˆmon†K (t)EˆmonK (t)〉, for K = A,B, (52)
and
CAB =
η2
Tg
∫ Tg
0
dt
∫ Tg
0
du 〈Eˆmon†A (t)EˆmonA (t)Eˆmon†B (u)EˆmonB (u)〉, (53)
where EˆmonK (t), for K = A,B. are the positive-frequency,
√
photons/sec-units field operators entering Alice and Bob’s
monitors. For phase-matching bandwidths of interest, we will have TgW ≫ 1, so that we can replace the average
photon-flux integrals in the preceding expressions with sums of photon-number operators for those fields’ Fourier-series
decompositions on the [0, Tg] time interval. We thus obtain
SK =
η
Tg
Mg∑
m=1
〈aˆmon†Km aˆmonKm 〉, (54)
and
CAB =
η2
Tg
Mg∑
m=1
Mg∑
n=1
〈aˆmon†Am aˆmonAm aˆ
mon†
Bn
aˆmonBn 〉, (55)
where Mg = TgW . The mode pairs { (aˆmonAm , aˆmonBm ) : 1 ≤ m ≤ Mg } are in statistically independent, identically
distributed, zero-mean Gaussian states that are characterized by the Wigner covariance matrix
ΛmonAB =
1
4


2NSPDC + 1 0
√
κBfκSκA CSPDC 0
0 2NSPDC + 1 0 −
√
κBfκSκA CSPDC√
κBfκSκA CSPDC 0 2κBκSNS + 1 0
0 −√κBfκSκA CSPDC 0 2κBκSNS + 1

 , (56)
from which we immediately get
SA = ηNSPDCW, (57)
SB = ηκBκSNSW, (58)
and, after use of Gaussian-state moment factoring [28],
CAB = SASBTg + η
2κBfκSκANSPDCW. (59)
Of course, Alice and Bob cannot exactly measure these ensemble average rates. Instead, they rely on time-average
singles-rates and coincidence-rate measurements—S˜A(TM ), S˜B(TM ), and C˜AB(TM )—made over a TM -s-long mea-
surement interval, where TM ≫ Tg. These are all unbiased estimators, i.e., 〈S˜A(TM )〉 = SA, 〈S˜B(TM )〉 = SB, and
〈C˜AB(TM )〉 = CAB . Furthermore, the signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) of the singles-rate measurements,
SNRK =
〈S˜K〉2
Var(S˜K)
≈ SKTM , for K = A,B, (60)
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will both be much greater than unity when TM ≥ 0.1 s for the parameter values of interest. For example, with
η = 0.9, NSPDC = 10
−3, and W = 2THz, we have SNRA ≥ 82.5 dB when TM ≥ 0.1 s. Likewise, for η = 0.9, NS = 0.1,
W = 2THz, κS = 10
−2, and κB = 0.1, we have SNRB ≥ 72.5 dB when TM ≥ 0.1 s. Thus in assessing how much time
Alice and Bob will need to ensure that Eve is constrained to 1 − f = 0.01 fractional illumination of Bob’s terminal,
we will assume that their singles-rate measurements are perfect. So, Alice and Bob can then estimate f using
f˜(TM ) =
(C˜AB(TM )− SASBTg)NS
ηκANSPDCSB
, (61)
where all of the parameters entering this estimator can be accurately calibrated.
It is easy to see that f˜(TM ) is unbiased, i.e., 〈f˜(TM )〉 = f . To ensure that Alice and Bob can accurately decide
that f = 0.99, we shall require that f˜(TM )’s standard deviation be δf ≤ 10−3. We have that
δf =
√
Var[C˜AB(TM )]NS
ηκANSPDCSB
. (62)
The variance term on the right satisfies
Var[C˜AB(TM )] =
1
TgTM
Var

 Mg∑
m=1
Mg∑
n=1
aˆmon
′†
Am
aˆmon
′
Am aˆ
mon′†
Bn
aˆmon
′
Bn

 , (63)
where
aˆmon
′
Am =
√
η aˆmonAm +
√
1− η vˆmonAm (64)
aˆmon
′
Bn =
√
η aˆmonBn +
√
1− η vˆmonBn , (65)
with the noise modes {vˆmonAm , vˆmonBn } being in their vacuum states. Equation (63) can be evaluated from Gaussian-state
moment factoring, with the following result,
Var[C˜AB(TM )] =
η4κBNSPDCW
TM
× [κABκA + (κSNS + 2κABκANSPDC)Mg + (1 + 2κBκSκA + κBκSNS)κSM2gNS] , (66)
where higher-order terms in NSPDC and NS have been neglected because their contributions are insignificant for
the parameter values of interest. Using this result in Eq. (62), we obtained the plot shown in Fig. 7 for the TM
value needed to get δf = 10−3, when Alice and Bob’s monitors have quantum efficiencies η = 0.9, and all the other
parameters are those given in the paper for the performance curves shown in its Fig. 4(a).
One-way path length (km)
lo
g 1
0
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)]
FIG. 7: Time duration TM needed for Alice and Bob’s channel monitoring to validate f ≥ 0.99 within a ±0.001 standard
deviation.
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